Abstract. This note explains the process of public opinion formation via a locally interactive, space-time analysis. The model we use is a special case of the general framework for modelling social interaction proposed in Blume and Durlauf (2001). In the reduced form of the model we study how each individual, when faced with the choice of one, out of two, opinions, tends to conform to the opinion held by the majority of her neighbours. We consider different, symmetric and asymmetric, majority rules. Depending on the specific behavioral rule, the aggregate process of opinion formation may display contagion on one specific opinion, or consensus among all individuals in the population, or co-existence of both opinions. Whenever consensus obtains, we observe the formation of homogeneous areas (clusters) that seem almost stationary along the dynamics.
Introduction
Although scholars, observers and analysts do not seem to agree as to what public opinion actually is, there seems to be a widespread consensus that it should be studied as an "interactive, multidimensional, continuously changing phenomenon whose diverse aspects form causally interrelated patternings" (Crespi, 1997, p. ix) . Two particular aspects are often emphasized in the sociological literature. The first is the fact that individuals faced with different choices as to whom -or what -to support show a tendency to be influenced by the opinion of some collective majority (mutual awareness, as defined in Crespi, 1997) . The second is that environmental conditions that are specific to each agent seem to matter in determining the outcome of individual choices (situational correlates of opinion, as in Crespi, 1997) . These features of the public opinion process seem to be well documented in terms of experimental and empirical evidence.
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This note studies a simple dynamic model of public opinion formation and aims at explaining the stylized fact that the support for one, out of two, issues at stake often shows a high degree of local homogeneity and persistent cross-sectional variance, that is only partly explained by fundamental differences in economic conditions. An intuitive explanation of this stylized fact is that each individual may show a tendency to conform to the opinion of what (s)he perceives to be the opinion of a collective majority. Since communication is highly decentralized among a large group of individuals, each individual's perception of such majority may only be based on local features of the environment where interaction takes place. In particular, the opinion held within the small subset of an individual's neighbours, colleagues, friends or relatives, may be given a higher weight than any information that is publicly available.
This note shows that the joint effect of local interaction and a tendency to agree with the opinion held by the majority, contribute to explain the creation of large homogeneous areas. The way this is done is by modeling the process of public opinion formation as a dynamic process, characterized by locally interactive patterns of behavior.
We postulate that the behaviour of each individual in forming an opinion is described by simple majority rules, that we take as primitives. Although we do not model it in detail, we show that these reduced forms are consistent with an explicit microeconomic foundation of the kind modeled in Blume and Durlauf (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2000, 2001) , and Durlauf (1999) for general locally interactive settings. Along these lines, in Ianni and Corradi (2000) we study a simple model of pre-electoral opinion formation that produces a reduced form consistent with majority rule behaviour.
We refer to the process of public opinion in its collective dimension as to the dynamic process generated by the aggregate of all the individual decisions, and we provide a stochastic formulation of its dynamics. In the paper we focus on a class of threshold functions and show how seemingly minor changes in the specification may have a relevant effect on the aggregate properties of the process. In fact, according to the specific behavioral rule followed by each individual, in the long run we may have contagion, where everyone will eventually agree on, say, opinion 1, or consensus where everyone will eventually agree on either of the two opinions, or we may instead have coexistence of both opinions. However, a common feature which we observe along the dynamics is the formation of large homogeneous areas. In the particular case in which consensus occurs, we are actually able to study the rate at which these areas grow and explain why along the dynamics they seem almost stationary.
Issues related to the process of public opinion formation are not tangential to economic theory. Public opinion plays a key role in shaping animal spirits, patterns of consumer and producer behaviour expectations and in particular voting decisions. As for the latter aspect, the specifications we study in this paper are motivated in terms of band-wagon effect (voters favour the party that is doing well in the polls), or projection effect (voters tend to project their intended vote onto their election outcome expectations). Since the theoretical studies of Simon (1954) and Baumol (1957) , empirical work carried out in the UK and in the USA seems to provide
